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Abstract
We analyze a simple multi-attribute procurement auction that uses
yardstick competition to settle prices. Upon receiving the submitted bids
the auctioneer computes the yardstick prices (bids) by a linear weighting
of the other participants’ bids. The auction simplifies the procurement
process by reducing the principal’s articulation of preferences to simply
choosing the most preferred offer as if it was a market with posted prices.
The auction is not incentive compatible. For some bidders, it may be
optimal to bid strategically and manipulate the outcome of the auction.
By simulations we show that these opportunities are limited. It is only a
small fraction of all bidders that may gain by deviating from submitting
true cost bids and this fraction is decreasing as the number of bidders
increases. Furthermore, for those that may gain from deviating from
telling the truth, the mechanism counteracts strategic bidding in both
thin and thick markets. In thin markets deviation have to be large and
therefore more risky, in thick markets only small deviations are optimal.
The yardstick auction is not efficient nor optimal relative to a situation
where the principal articulates his preferences a priori and uses the efficient
second score auction. However, the auction approximates efficiency and
the cost of not investing sufficient time and money in articulating a scoring
function a priori, is also diminishing as the number of bidders increases.
Compared with the efficient second score auction, our numerical results
suggest that the yardstick auction generates approximately 1% less social
values and 2% less private value with 10 or more bidders.
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1 Introduction
Efficient and flexible procurement systems are often crucial for the success of
any organization. As a buyer, organizations obviously want to minimize their
spending but attributes such as various types of qualities, delivery time etc.
may represent other forms of important objectives as well. Consequently, the
development of procurement systems faces an ongoing challenge in designing
trading systems that facilitate transparent competition on both price and mul-
tiple attributes as well as ensuring sufficient flexibility for operational purposes.
A traditional negotiation process allows full flexibility in the two-sided match-
ing of buyers and sellers, but it is typically ill-structured and opaque. Multi-
attribute auctions (scoring auctions), on the other hand, specify a priori trans-
parent rules for the procurement ”game”, but obviously allows for less flexibil-
ity1.
Che (1993) analyzes the two most common scoring auctions: the first score and
the second score auction.2 These two auctions have many similarities with the
first and second price auctions. In fact, Che (1993) proves that the revenue
equivalence theorem also holds for the first and second score auctions3. It is
well known that the second score auction is efficient and strategy proof and we
therefore use the second score auction as benchmark in our analysis of alternative
auction designs.4
In practice, though, there is no particular reason to expect that the scoring
function is known a priori by the buyer (principal). The determination of the
scoring function may be complicated for several reasons. For instance, when
the principal is a single person and the scoring represents the principal’s intra-
personal trade-offs, these complications are a central topic of a large literature on
Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM), see e.g. Tzeng and Huang (2011).
When the principal represents a group of persons (e.g., an organization), the
construction of the scoring may involve inter-personal conflicts. The complica-
tion of this is no less as reflected by the large literature on Social Choice, see
e.g. Arrow (1963), Moulin (1991).5
1See e.g. Bichler et al. (2003), Teich et al. (2004) and Teich et al. (2006) for a more
elaborated introduction and presentation of several mechanisms that incorporate multiple
attributes.
2In a first score auction, the bidder with the highest score wins and has to meet the highest
score. In a second score auction, the bidder with the highest score wins and has to meet the
second highest score.
3Using the revenue equivalence theorem as it is presented in Riley and Samuelson (1981).
4However, it is not given that the Second Score auction is the most preferred auction by
the principal. Bogetoft and Nielsen (2008) show that it is possible for the principal to extract
more informational rent while the auction remains efficient and strategy proof.
5Empirical cases support the claim that determination of a scoring function is a difficult
matter. For instance, in the conservation reserve program the USDA (United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture) rank the bids into a score. The actual determination of these scoring
rules has been widely discussed, see e.g. Babcock et al. (1996, 1997). The applied scoring has
also been an issue in the wholesale market for electricity in California. Here the choice of
3
In this paper we analyze a simple multi-attribute auction (the yardstick auction)
that does not rely on well specified preferences (scoring) of the buyer a priori.
The yardstick auction was introduced in Bogetoft and Nielsen (2003) and it
basically replaces the principal’s scoring with yardstick competition: Sellers
(agents) submit price-bids that are replaced with yardstick prices estimated
by a simple linear weighting of the other sellers’ bids when applicable. The
preprocessed bids (the yardstick bids) are reviewed by the principal. The auction
ends by the principal simply selecting the most preferred yardstick bid and the
winning seller is compensated with the yardstick price of the winning bid.
However, the yardstick auction mechanism is not strategy-proof. As discussed
in Bogetoft and Nielsen (2008) there may be ways for a bidder to manipulate
the auction and gain by deviating from truth-telling so truth-telling is not even
a Nash equilibrium6.
We focus on a two-dimensional model (price and one additional attribute) and
show analytically how a bidder may gain by deviating from truth-telling (ex
post). Next, we set up a simulation framework in order to examine the ex-
tend to which it pays off to deviate from submitting the true cost bid. In the
simulation we consider two main scenarios, the most optimal deviation from
truth-telling for respectively the bidder with the best chance of becoming the
winner (the runner-up) and a random bidder. When doing so, we further in-
troduce the possibility of sellers being technically inefficient in producing the
attribute. This aspect matters here since the yardstick prices are determined
by convex envelopment of the data points and in practice it is well known that
technical inefficiency often occurs.
We demonstrate that although the auction allows room for manipulation, this
room is somewhat limited. It is only a small fraction of all bidders that may
gain by deviating from truthful bidding and this fraction is decreasing as the
number of bidders increases. Furthermore, with as few as 3 bidders those that
may benefit from deviating have to deviate a lot. It appears that the mech-
anism counteracts deviation in both thin and thick markets; in thin markets
successful deviations have to be large and therefore more risky from an ex ante
perspective; in thick markets successful deviations can be smaller but have to
be confined within a narrower range again making deviation risky from an ex
ante perspective.
Moreover, we demonstrate that the average loss from not articulating prefer-
ences (i.e. constructing a scoring function) is relatively small both in terms of
social and private values. In a thin market with as few as 3 bidders it ranks
from 10 to 16% relative to a traditional second score auction with linear scoring.
With just 7 bidders the cost decreases to 2-5% and continuous to drop as the
number of bidders increases.
an unsuitable scoring rule had severe consequences, see Bushnell and Oren (1994) and Chao
(2002).
6A third paper using the underlying yardstick principle as part of an auction mechanism
is Aparicio et al. (2008).
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Therefore we conclude that in a situation where the cost of articulating prefer-
ences a priori is relative high compared to the social and private values at stake
(e.g. when small firms or consumers engage in multi-attribute competition as
if it was a market with posted prices), the suggested mechanism seems to rep-
resent an attractive alternative in practice to more informationally demanding
mechanisms.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the procurement
setting and the yardstick prices. Section 3 describes the yardstick auction and
shows analytically then deviating from truth-telling is optimal (ex post). Section
4 introduces the simulation framework and the results are presented in Section
5, while Section 6 concludes.
2 Setting
In this section, the procurement setting and the applied yardstick prices are
presented.
2.1 Procurement setting
We consider a risk neutral principal seeking to procure a good or a project from
one of n risk neutral agents, i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}.
In particular, we consider the simplified case where the properties of the good
offered by agent i are given by a one-dimensional variable yi ∈ R0. We may
for example consider yi as the quality level of the (fixed amount of) output
delivered.
To focus on the adverse selection problems we further assume that delivery of
the promised qualities can be costlessly enforced (e.g. by a harsh penalty for
deviations).
To produce the output level yi, agent i needs inputs. Inputs will be aggregated
into a single dimensional cost ci ∈ R0. The production cost c
i is private infor-
mation to agent i. All involved parties know that c = (c1, . . . , cn) belongs to
some unknown common cost structure C ⊆ Rn0 .
Since the actual quality level yi is verifiable, possible manipulations regard the
costs. Therefore, the signal from agent i is simply a price-quality bid
(xi, yi) ∈ R20
with the interpretation that agent i is willing to produce quality level yi if he is
paid at least xi.
We assume throughout that the aim of the agent is to maximize (expected)
profit:
πi = bi − ci
5
where bi is the payment to bidder i.
The aim of the principal is to maximize (expected) net value, i.e., the value
generated by the good minus the costs of acquiring it. If the principal is a social
planner seeking to maximize social value, the objective value when agent i is
selected is:
V (yi)− ci
where V (.) is a weakly increasing value function. More generally, we could let
the objective be V (yi) − (1 + ǫ)ci, where ǫ ≥ 0 reflects the possible costs of
distortions from the collection of public funds. Since it has no influence on the
results–except that all costs are increased by a factor (1 + ǫ)–we simply assume
that ǫ = 0.
If the principal is a private, profit maximizing entity, the net value when agent
i is selected, is:
V (yi)− bi
i.e. the value minus the payment to agent i.
2.2 The Bidders’ Cost Structure and Yardstick Prices
As mentioned above, it is common knowledge that the reported costs of the
agent (as exposed in the bid xi) comes from some underlying common cost
structure represented by a cost function C(y).
We assume that C(y) = min{x | (x, y) is feasible} is:
A1. Weakly increasing : y′ ≥ y ⇒ C(y′) ≥ C(y),
A2. Convex : C(γy + (1− γ)y′) ≤ γC(y) + (1− γ)C(y′), ∀γ ∈ [0, 1].
A number of different cost models satisfy these two simple requirements, but we
will assume that a trusted third party (e.g. the auctioneer) estimates the cost
function using a convex envelopment of the observed bids (that is the smallest
of such models including all observed data) as illustrated in Figure 1.
For each agent i ∈ N a yardstick price C−i(yi), as illustrated in Figure 2, is
defined as follows:
Definition 1. For all i ∈ N the yardstick price x¯i is computed as:
x¯i = C−i(yi) = inf{x ∈ R0 | x ≥
∑
j∈I,j 6=i
λjxj , yi ≤
∑
j∈I,j 6=i
λjyj ,
∑
λ = 1, λj ≥ 0}.
(1)
The above solution identifies a single point (x¯i, yi) on the spanned frontier (being
the smallest convex envelopment of all bids except for bidder i’s bid).
Note that for some values of y, the associated yardstick costs may be infinite
(e.g., bid E in the figure). In the yardstick auction presented in Section 3 this is
dealt with by asking the principal to announce an upper bound on the bids, i.e.
the highest value of y and its associated reservation price x that the principal
is willing to accept.
6
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Figure 1: Convex cost structure
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Figure 2: Yardstick cost
3 The Yardstick Auction
In this section, we present the rules defining the yardstick auction and show
analytically how bidders may gain by deviating from truth-telling in this auction.
3.1 The Yardstick Auction:
The rules defining the auction are provided by the stepwise procedure below.
Step 0: The principal announces the procurement proposal and an upper bound
on the bids zP = (yP , xP ), where yP is the highest acceptable value of y
and xP is the highest acceptable price for yP .
Step 1: Each participant i ∈ N submit a single sealed bid zi = (xi, yi) to a
Trusted Third Party (TTP). Let Z be the set of bids including zP , i.e.,
Z = {zi}i∈N ∪ z
P .
Step 2: The TTP computes a yardstick price x¯i = C−i(yi) for all i ∈ N (see
definition 1) that replaces xi when xi ≤ x¯i. Let z¯i = (x¯i, yi) be the
yardstick bid of agent i ∈ N and let Z¯ be the set of such yardstick bids.
Step 3: The set Z¯ is presented to the principal, who selects the winning bid
z¯i
∗∗
.
Step 4: The winner i∗∗ is compensated by x¯i
∗∗
and losers are not compensated.
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In Step 0, the principal starts the auction by publicly announcing zP stating
the maximum value of the attribute in question yP and its reservation price xP
for yP . zP enters the auction both as a submitted bid as well as a yardstick
bid. Thereby, xP addresses the problem of non-existing yardstick price for the
maximal value of y among the bidders.
The remaining parts of the auction run as follows: In Step 1, the bidders submit
their sealed bids. In Step 2, the yardstick prices (C−i(yi)) are computed (as
illustrated in Figure 2). If C−i(yi) ≥ xi the bidders are assigned a yardstick
bid by replacing the submitted price-bid with the computed yardstick price. In
Step 3, the principal reviews the yardstick bids and selects a single yardstick
bid as the winner of the auction. Step 4, finalizes the auction by compensating
the selected winner with his yardstick price.
The auction may be seen as a mechanism for settling posted prices on goods and
services with linear weighting of price and other attributes. In fact in comparing
with the second score auction, the mechanism settles the most pessimistic prices
seen from the principal’s point of view. To see this, note that the yardstick prices
are equal to the the highest possible second score compensation, i.e. the scoring
function that is just spanned by the other agents’ bids in the exact same ways
as the common cost structure is estimated in Definition 1.
Therefore, due to the use of linear scoring functions, there will will always be a
cost of not articulating a scoring function a priori (we measure this in Section
5).
3.2 Strategic Behavior
We now turn towards issues related to bidders’ possible strategic behavior. As
mentioned in the introduction, we consider the situation where it is impossible
(or costly) for the principal to articulate a scoring function a priori. However,
we assume that it is possible for the principal to make a unique selection in Step
3 of the mechanism, which is consistent with some kind of underlying concave
scoring function.
Suppose that the agents have submitted their true bids zi = (xi, yi) and yard-
stick bids z¯i = (x¯i, yi) have been determined adding the point zP to the observed
data. As shown below truth-telling is not a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1: Consider a given agent i ∈ N . By increasing the price bid xi
up to at most the yardstick price x¯i both neighbor yardstick bids increase and
thereby weakly increases i’s change of winning the auction.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary agent i ∈ N . First, note that changes in i’s price
bid xi has no influence on i’s computed yardstick bid z¯i (as this is determined
excluding agent i’s bid from the data set).
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Now, if i increases his price bid to x′i > xi (x′i ≤ x¯i), then both i’s neighbors
will obtain higher yardstick price bids: Indeed, i has a neighbor yardstick bid
to the left z¯i
l
and to the right z¯i
r
(these always exist since zP and z0 are added
to the observed data). The yardstick bid, z¯i
l
, is determined by zi and zi
l
l
(or
zi alone if zi
l
l
= z0). If zi
l
l
= z0 it is clear that x¯i
l
increases when xi increases
(with the same amount). If zi
l
l
6= z0 we note that the facet spanned by zi
l
l
and zi becomes steeper as zi
l
l
is fixed while i increases the price bid x′i > xi.
Hence, x¯i
l
increases. Now, assume that i has a neighbor yardstick bid to the
right z¯i
r
and let zi
r
r
be its neighbor bid to the right (possibly zP ). The bid zi
r
is determined by zi and zi
r
r
. Since the facet spanned by zi and zi
r
r
becomes
flatter as i increases his price bid while zi
r
r
remains fixed, we get that x¯i
r
increases.
Since the yardstick bid of both neighbors increase if i increases his price bid,
both neighbor agents will get non-increasing scores while the other agents (in-
cluding i) have unchanged score. Thus, i’s chance of winning the auction weakly
increases. △
Note that if agent i bids above his yardstick price bid he will loose the auction
for sure.
In a similar fashion we can show that if agent i decreases his price bid both
neighbor agents will get decreasing yardstick price bids which in turn weakly
decreases i chance of winning the auction. Thus, bidding below ones true bid
is disadvantageous unless the bid is so low that it in fact excludes the neigh-
bor agent from the auction (in the sense that it makes the neighbor agent j’s
yardstick bid go below j’s true cost). Such a situation is illustrated in figure 3,
where i decreases his bid zi to z′i and hereby exclude j from the auction.
We summarize in the following observation.
Observation 1: Since the yardstick price remains unchanged, bidding suffi-
ciently below true costs is therefore always a beneficial deviation from truth-
telling unless there are limits to how low bids the principal accepts.
4 The Simulation Framework
In this section, we present the simulation framework that allows us to analyze
to what extend it pays off to deviate from truth-telling in the yardstick auction.
First, we randomly generate agents bids. Specifically, agent i’s attribute value
yi is independently drawn from the uniform distribution U [1, 10] and the agents’
cost is determined by the common underlying cost function x(y) = Cy2, where
C is measuring the degree of technical inefficiency in production: Initially, we
9
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Figure 3: Excluding the neighbor yardstick bid
assume no technical inefficiency (C = 1), and then proceeds to examine two dif-
ferent levels of technical inefficiency with C independently drawn from U(1, 1.1)
and U(1, 1.2), i.e., all bidders initiate from the same common underlying tech-
nology with up to 0, 10 and 20% technical inefficiency being introduced via the
cost function.
Second, we introduce the principal’s value function. We assume that the prin-
cipal selects a winner of the auction as if there was an underlying linear scoring
function given as V (y) = 10y, where the slope equal to 10 is the slope of the
common cost structure for y = 5.
We simulate the mechanism 103 times with the number of participants ranging
in {3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 30}. For every iteration we simulate the participating
agents’ bids (y, x) by randomly drawing y and C (depending on the scenario),
compute the yardstick bids and corresponding scores, identify the winner of the
auction and finally calculate its utility.
Based on the above setting we perform two sets of simulations. In the first
set we simulate the misreporting of the runner-up agent’s cost (the agent with
the second highest score during the auction) and calculate the effect of that
misreporting on the agent’s utility. In the second set we follow an identical
process but for a randomly selected agent instead (it can also be one of the
inefficient agents). The range of misreporting varies from 40% to 140% of a
selected agent’s true cost and increases in an interval of 1%.
To this end, and since a successful manipulation can be both above and below
the true cost, we harvest the following five quantities:
A1 - Successful above: The percentage of all simulated auctions where the
selected agent may win with a gain by bidding up till 140% of true cost.
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A2 - Above to succeed: The smallest percentage increase of true cost for
those who successfully may win with a gain by bidding up till 140% of
true cost.
A3 - Successful Interval: The interval in percentage points where those who
successfully may win with a gain by bidding up till 140% of true cost
remains the winner.
B1- Successful below: The percentage of all simulated auctions where the
selected agent may win with a gain by bidding down to 40% of true cost.
B2 - Below to succeed: The smallest percentage decrease of true cost for
those who successfully may win with a gain by bidding down to 40% of
true cost.
In addition to this, we examine the simulated auctions with respect to efficiency
(if the social value is maximized) and the costs to the principal of not stating
a scoring function a priori. This we simply do by comparing the outcome of
the yardstick auction with that of a second score auction. We use the second
score auction as benchmark since it relies on a well-defined scoring function, is
efficient and strategy proof, see e.g. Che (1993). The results of this analysis are
summarized through the following three quantities:
E1 - Degree of efficiency: The percentage of the iterations of the algorithm
where the yardstick auction selects the same winner as the second score
auction i.e. selecting the bidder that maximizes the social value V (yi)−ci,
for more see Section 2.
E2 - Efficiency cost: The relative cost in social values, by not being efficient.
That is: V (y
i∗)−ci∗−(V (yi∗∗)−ci∗∗)
V (yi∗)−ci∗ where i∗ and i ∗ ∗ is respectively the
winner of second score auction and the yardstick auction.
E3 - Cost of no scoring: The relative cost to the principal of not construct-
ing a scoring function a priori and then use the second score auction.
That is:
V (yi∗)−bi∗
SSA
−(V (yi∗∗)−bi∗∗
Y A
)
V (yi∗)−bi∗
SSA
where bi∗SSA and b
i∗∗
Y A is respectively
the compensation to the winners of the second score auction (i∗) and the
yardstick auction (i ∗ ∗). Hereby we assume that the principal could have
constructed (by sufficient investments) the same scoring function that he
(indirectly) end up using in the yardstick auction.
Technically, all simulations are done in R and all DEA programs are solved using
the ”Benchmarking” package for R, cf. Bogetoft and Otto (2011) and Bogetoft
and Otto (2012).
11
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Figure 4: Average deviation above true cost to gain for runner-up
5 The Simulation Results
Having described the simulation’s input parameters and objectives we now
present our numerical findings for the two sets of simulations.
5.1 The runner-up
In this Section we consider the bidder with the best possibilities for manipulating
the auction (the runner-up), hereby we measure the worst case scenario ex post.
Analytically, we know that it may pay off to bid above true cost for a runner-
up by making the neighbor bidders look less attractive to the principal. From
the simulations we see that with 3 bidders approximately 15% of all runner-ups
may gain by bidding above true cost; however they would have to bid more
than 14% above on average, and no more than 20% not to exclude themselves
(see Figures 4 and 5)). As the number of bidders increases, the runner-up
may win the auction by a smaller increase but it also becomes more difficult to
avoid excluding themselves. For instance, for 10 bidders the runner-up should
approximately bid between 4 and 8% above true cost on average (see Figures 4
and 5))7. Therefore, bidding above in a thin market requires a large deviation
from truth-telling and as the number of participants increases the interval in
which deviation is optimal narrows down considerably.
Bidding below true cost is of less concern for the principal who, in our model,
only wants to minimize expenditures (provided the seller is able to deliver the
7In Figure 5, the interval in which the runner-up may gain is smaller for the for 3 that for
4 bidders and then it decreases as the number of bidders increases. The reason for this comes
from the way the mechanism settle prices for the one with the lowest y.
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Figure 6: Average deviation below true cost to gain for runner-up
attribute level as promised). Since the runner-up does not influence his own
yardstick price and the winner is a neighbor, it always pays off for a runner-up
to bid below true cost. However, with 3 bidders, a runner-up has to bid more
than approximately 15% below in order to gain (see Figure 6). As the number
of bidders increases, it becomes easier for a runner-up to gain by bidding below.
Unlike results on bidding above, introducing inefficiency in production has a
much higher impact here. The more technical inefficiency, the more it takes to
deviate below in order to gain for the runner-up.
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5.2 A random bidder
As for the runner-up, we also measure the most optimal behavior for a random
bidder ex post. There is of course a 1/n% probability of that agent being the
runner-up, as there is an equal probability of the selected agent being the actual
winner of the auction. Also, a random bidder may be technically inefficient, i.e.
a bidder that will have a loss if winning the auction by misreporting (e.g., say
the random bidder is the only technically inefficient bidder with a true cost
above his yardstick cost, then bidding below he may risk to win the auction
being compensated with his yardstick cost).
Unlike the runner-up only around 5% of randomly chosen bidders in the case of
3 bidders would gain by bidding above and this number decreases to less than
1% as the number of bidders increase.
For those that may gain by bidding above their true costs, the average deviation
is similar to the results for the runner-up. The results have the same tendency:
it is just approximately 0.5% less than the results in Figure 4 and 5. The reason
for this is that the main part of those random bidders that may gain by bidding
above are in fact the runner-ups.
The effects of under-reporting by a randomly selected agent differs significantly
from that of the runner-up though. The percentage that may gain by bidding
below is much smaller and the level of technical inefficiency now has a large
impact. If all bidders are efficient, bidding below is essentially a ”free lunch” as
for the runner-up (however in the simulation we only allow the bidders to bid
40% of true cost). But if we introduce technical inefficiency, winning by bidding
below may result in a loss. This has a great impact on the percentage that
may gain by bidding below. With 3 bidders approximately 30% may gain which
decreases to approximately 10% as the number of bidders increases. Finally, for
those that gain by bidding below, deviation requires more aggressive bidding as
the number of bidders increases, see Figure 7.
5.3 Efficiency and cost of no scoring
We now turn to the overall performance of the yardstick auction with respect
to efficiency (i.e. maximizing social value) and the costs to the principal from
not articulating a scoring function a priori. This we do by presenting measures
introduced in Section 4 that compare the outcome of the yardstick auction with
that of the second score auction.
First we consider the efficiency of the yardstick auction assuming that the un-
derlying scoring function used for the simulation is in fact the principal’s true
scoring function.
Initially we measure to what extend the two auctions select the same winner
(E1). In the case where some bidders are technically inefficient (C = 1.1 or
1.2), the percentage of auctions having the same winner increases only a little
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Figure 7: Average deviation below true cost to gain for a random bidder
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Figure 8: Decrease in social values by using the yardstick auction
with the number of bidders. With only 3 participants 50% of all auctions have
the same winner which increases to approximately 70% with 30 bidders. In the
special case where all bidders are fully efficient in production (C = 1), half of
the auctions have the same winner independent of the number of bidders.
Although, the yardstick auction may not select the most efficient winner, we
have that the yardstick auction becomes increasingly efficient as the number
of bidders increases. This we measure by E2, introduced in Section 4, which
captures the average relative loss in social values by using the yardstick auction.
Figure 8 shows that E2 decreases from 7-9% with 3 bidders to approximately
1% or less for 10 or more bidders. With four or more bidders this result is
independent of whether the bidders are technically efficient or not.
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Figure 9: Decrease in private values by no scoring
Suppose the principal could have constructed a scoring function a priori and
used the second score auction instead. The loss by not doing so and using
our suggested yardstick auction is measured by E3, introduced in Section 4,
which captures the average relative loss in private value of the principal by
using the yardstick auction. Figure 9 shows that E3 decreases from 10-14%
with 3 bidders to approximately 2% or less for 10 or more bidders. The results
are only slightly affected by whether the bidders are technically efficient or not,
with a small tendency towards a higher cost the more inefficient the bidders are
in production.
As presented in Section 4, the mechanism can be seen as a mechanism that post
the most pessimistic prices seen from the principal’s point of view given linear
scoring. Therefore the E3 measure will always be positive8.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed a multi-attribute procurement auction that applies yardstick
competition to simplify the principal’s weighting of costs and benefits. The
auction reduces the cost of articulating preferences to a mere problem of picking
a favored alternative (as with posted prices). We measure the possibilities for a
bidder to manipulate the auction as well as the overall social and private costs
of leaving out scoring.
The average loss from not articulating preferences (i.e. constructing a scoring
function) is relatively small both in terms of social and private values. In a
thin market with as few as 3 bidders it ranks from 10 to 16% relative to the
8Note that this does not hold for strictly concave scoring, which may settle second-score-
prices that are higher than the yardstick prices.
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traditional second score auction with a linear scoring function. With just 7
bidders the cost decreases to 2-5% and continues to drop as the number of
bidders increases.
Moreover, although in theory it may be optimal for the bidders to bid strate-
gically and manipulate the outcome of the auction, the simulations show that
these opportunities seem limited in practice. It is only a small fraction of all
bidders that may gain by deviating from submitting a true cost bid (bidding
above) and this fraction is decreasing as the number bidders increases. Further-
more, the range for which it is optimal to deviate (both above and below) also
narrows down rather fast as the number of bidders increases. Hence, from an ex
ante perspective, it appears that bidders should be careful deviating from the
true cost as it easily results in either ”winners curse” (if bidding too aggressively
below) or self exclusion from the auction (if bidding too aggressively above).
The yardstick auction is not efficient nor optimal relative to a situation where
the principal articulates his preferences a priori and uses the efficient second
score auction. However, the auction approximates efficiency and the cost of not
investing sufficient time and effort in articulating a scoring function a priori is
also diminishing as the number of bidders increases. With 10 bidders the cost
of not announcing a scoring function is less than 2% of the private value to the
principal.
Therefore we conclude that in a situation where the cost of articulating pref-
erences a priori is relatively large compared to the social and private values
involved, the suggested yardstick auction seems to perform rather well in prac-
tice and is highly operational compared to other forms of auction designs.
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